نسخه فارسي   |   Shqipëria

“Nejat Society” Front entity of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence crackdown

Jan 25
  • Print

Objective in forming “Nejat Society”
youness1iThe Nejat Society was formed in 2001 by Iran’ Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) as a ministry branch under the direct supervision of then intelligence minister Ali Younessi. The objective in forming this MOIS branch was the use of relatives of members of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), through force or threats, in a propaganda and psychological war against the PMOI in order to then pave the path for the destruction of the PMOI in Camp Ashraf by forcing them to defect from the organization and prepare the grounds for military attacks and killings.
The MOIS, loathed inside Iran and the international community for its crimes, has introduced the Nejat Society as a non-government organization formed by PMOI family members (!) and former PMOI members (!), to cover up their crimes.nejat


“Nejat Society” Agents
The main members of the Nejat Society have been in their posts for years, along with MOIS mole elements. The Ministry of Intelligence has used its agents who infiltrated into the National Liberation Army of Iran yet were identified. After admitting about their mission they were expelled and later on used as former PMOI members (!) in the MOIS.
Others include individuals who had spent some time in PMOI camps in Iraq and returned to Iran to continue on with their ordinary lives. However, they are now being used by the MOIS in branches of the Nejat Society.
In a few rare cases prior to their identities being identified they were able to murder a number of PMOI members. In none of these cases did the PMOI retaliate in vengeance attacks and the regime agents were all returned to Iran.
The firm abidance by this mentioned principle has allowed the Iranian regime to easily hire agents to infiltrate into the PMOI, and after they were identified, at their return they are identified by the Iranian regime as senior members of the PMOI for the MOIS. Four of these individuals, now Nejat Society officials working inside Iran, are introduced below.

Taleb Jalilian
Head of Nejat Society in Kermanshah (west of Iran)
Expelled from PMOI for being a Iranian regime agent infiltrating into the PMOI

talebTaleb Jalilian was born in 1961 and a second lieutenant inside the Iranian regime. He became a refugee in Iraq in 1988 and asked to join the PMOI. He then became suspicious and finally admitted to his true mission.
After the names of a number of Iranian regime agents were unveiled in a PMOI publication he attempted, but failed, to flee back to Iran.
He wrote in this regard:
“After witnessing the names of Iranian regime agents in the PMOI publication, I became worried of my cover being revealed and decided to reach Iran’s borders as soon as possible.”
This individual was finally expelled from the PMOI and is currently in charge of the Nejat Society branch in Kermanshah.

 taleb3  “Hired as a second lieutenant by the regime’s intelligence apparatus, I came to Iraq on a mission to infiltrate into the NLA.
“In February 1998 after reading the names of a number of Iranian regime agents unveiled in a PMOI publication, I became worried of my cover being unveiled and decided to reach Iran’s borders as soon as possible. That is why I fled Camp Ashraf for Iran’s borders on March 24, 1998.”

Taleb Jalilian
March 26, 1988

taleb2

Mohammad Bagher Momenzadeh
MOIS agent in Nejat Society - Fars Province
momenzadehMohammad Bagher Momenzadeh was born in 1965 in the city of Shiraz, who also uses the nom de guerre of Afkhami. In January 1997 he was missioned by an individual by the name of Azizi (aka Imami), an official inside the Bushehr Intelligence Bureau in charge of dispatching Iranian regime agents to infiltrate into NLA. After undergoing an intense course of training in Tehran including: facial identification, describing and identifying, distance estimation, preparing reports and viewing six video tapes of an Iranian regime agent Mohammad Reza Edalatian (Hassan Mashhadi) on the subject of infiltrating into the NLA and how to behave as a PMOI member, he was then sent to infiltrate into the PMOI. Upon his entrance into the NLA he was identified as a suspicious figure and finally identified for his work for the mullahs’ regime. He then immediately fled to the Iranian regime and continued his activities for the MOIS as the official in charge of the Fars Province branch of the Nejat Society. Under the name of Afkhami he currently makes phone calls to PMOI supporters and places them under various types of pressure and insults in order to give in to cooperating with the MOIS.

momenzadeh2
“My name is Mohammad Bagher Momenzadeh, son of Mansour, born on February 12th, 1966, social security number 1373 issued in Shiraz, and I admit to being sent by Khomeini’s MOIS in order to spy and gather information on the PMOI’s computer networks, sabotage and inflict blows to the NLA. Following various training and briefs by Khomeini’s intelligence agents in the city of Bushehr and Tehran, I was sent to Ilam and on May 29, 1997 through the Sangar Nader crossing in Ilam Province and into Iraq. 
“In Iraq I introduced myself to Iraqi officials and agents as a PMOI supporter. I have now realized about my betrayal and ask the PMOI for their forgiveness.”
First and Last Name
Mohammad Bagher Momenzadeh

Nejat Societ chief in Isfahan
was MOIS mole in the PMOI

Ref’at Yazdan-parast came to Iraq from Turkey back in September 1995. She was immediately arrested by Iraqi security organs. Despite introducing herself as a PMOI sympathizer it was made clear in the initial investigations that she has been dispatched by the Iranian regime and without the PMOI being involved at all the relevant Iraqi officials and organs had her returned to the Iranian regime. She first intended to go to the United Nations Office in Iraq and come in contact with the PMOI. However, on January 22nd, 1997 the PMOI informed the U.N. office in Iraq that Yaszdan-parast is an Iranian regime mole missioned to infiltrate into the PMOI, and they refused to allow her in.
From then on the MOIS introduces her as a “former and defected PMOI member”, and she has been appointed as in charge of chief of Nejat Society branch in Isfahan. An MOIS-affiliated website by the name of Iran Dideban on January 24th, 2006 introduced her as a “member of the Nejat Society Central Council”.
Before being dispatched to infiltrate into the PMOI, Yazdan-parast had married an individual by the name of Haji Fakur (police colonel), head of a ward in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison.

Mohsen Hashemi Bajgirani
Nejat Society chief in Isfahan
Mohsen Hashemi Bajgirani, born in 1963, was recruited and hired by the MOIS in the city of Abadan (southwest Iran) back in 1991. On January 20th, 1995 after three years of cooperation with the Isfahan Intelligence Department, and identifying and providing information about PMOI supporters inside Iran, he entered southern Iraq through water borders with the intention of penetrating into the NLA. He was expelled by the PMOI after his true identity as a mole to carry out MOIS missions was unveiled. After his expulsion he returned to the MOIS and continued his missions ordered by the ministry in Isfahan. He is currently taking part in all activities of the Nejat Society in Isfahan.

hashemi

Handwriting of Mohsen Hashmi before being expelled by the PMOI in 1994
He is admitting to being a mole on a mission to penetrate into PMOI

“My name is Seyed Mohsen Hashemi and I was missioned on January 20th, 1995 by the Khomeini regime’s MOIS to penetrate into the PMOI and NLA. I entered Iraq and these entities. My mission was to transfer my information and whatever I saw to the outside after two years by announcing my defection. When I say transfer my information outside I mean provide them to the MOIS.”
Seyed Mohsen Hashemi
March 10th, 1997

Under the pretext of “Nejat Society”, the MOIS pursues its political objectives against the PMOI in Iraq. In this regard the regime’s foreign ministry and embassy in Baghdad, along with the Revolutionary Guards Quds Force (Tehran’s extraterritorial terrorist arm) are in full cooperation with this ministry.

The names of some elements and cover-up figures for the PMOI who take part as “Nejat Society” members in plots against the PMOI – sent to harass and threaten PMOI families and supporters – are as follows:
- MOIS element in Lorestan Province (Khoram Abad): Mohammad Khosropour
- MOIS element in West Azerbaijan (Orumieh) and Kermanshah provinces: Arash Rezaie
- MOIS element in Kermanshah: Taleb Jalilian
- MOIS element in Alborz Province (Karaj) : Bijan Rezavandi
- MOIS element in Central Province (Arak): Foad Basri
- MOIS element in in Tehran Province : Mehrdad Taghipour
- MOIS element in East Azerbaijan Province (Tabriz): Ali Asghari
- MOIS element in Isfahan, Yazd & Kerman provinces: Mohsen Hashemi
- MOIS element in Khuzestan Province (Ahvaz): Hamid Dehdar Hassani
- MOIS element in Mazandaran & Golestan provinces: Hadi Shaabani
- MOIS element in Fars Province (Shiraz): Mohammad Bagher Momenzadeh
- MOIS element in Booshehr: Ramin Farzin
- MOIS element in Gilan: Ghorbanali Pour Ahmadi
- MOIS element in in Mashad: Mehran Karimdadi
- MOIS element Batoul Soltani of the “Sahar Association”

Pictures of various Nejat Society members who work for the MOIS
all

 

KhodabandehIbrahim Khodabandaeh is a known MOIS element in the Nejat Society. He goes to see PMOI family members in various cities on behalf of the Nejat Society, and he resorts to threats and bribes to get letters and statements from them against the PMOI. He uses such texts in his posts for MOIS-affiliated websites.

Regime officials confessing to real nature of Nejat Society members
In the first year that the Nejat Society was founded, then Iranian regime intelligence minister Ali Younessi said on August 31st, 2003: “We have used various PMOI elements against the PMOI.”

Hosseinali Amiri, General Director of the Judiciary in Fars province, Iran, stated,

“Nejat Association is made up of those who have left hypocrites [the name used by the Iranian regime for the PMOI] in each province, under the supervision of the Intelligence Ministry and the section for combating hypocrites. They are very active. Without referring to Ministry of Intelligence, they are contacting almost all families of the members of the hypocrites through the country …” (www.nejatngo.org, 2 May 2004)

European Parliament Delegation Investigation Results
EU1In 2005 a European Parliament investigative delegation visited Camp Ashraf. This delegation consisted of Paolo Casaca and Andre Brie. After their return from Camp Ashraf they published a report of what they witnessed. One part of this report reads:

The role of Nejat
In discussions with residents at Camp Ashraf, the delegation was informed of various forms of psychological pressure placed on the families of PMOI members living in Iran, by the Iranian regime or groups affiliated with the regime.
Upon its return, the delegation conducted research into these groups, which are said to be set up in order to save PMOI members imprisoned in Camp Ashraf. One example is an organisation by the name of ‘Nejat’ or rescue translated into Farsi. The main aim of these groups appear to be to place pressure on the family members of PMOI members in Camp Ashraf, to in turn place pressure on their relatives in Camp Ashraf to leave the Camp and return to Iran.

Letter from Lord Corbett on demonizing measures by “Nejat Society” in the UK

UK pLord Corbett of Castle Vale
House of Lords
London SW1A 0PW
28 January 2008

Dear Colleagues,
… Whenever an MP or Peer expresses support for the goals of the Resistance, they are bombarded with misinformation about it, either by the Iranian Embassy in London or front organisations and individuals who pose as disaffected former members of the PMOI. Some pose as NGOs, including Nejat Society, Peyvand and Aawa Association. The Iranian regime also uses numerous websites to spread misinformation against the PMOI, including those listed below:
www.irandidban.com www.iran-interlink.org
www.nejatngo.org www.habilian.com
www.iranpeyvand.com www.survivorsreport.org

From psychological war & torture to paving the path for murder & massacres
In a new round of pressures against Ashraf residents, in early 2010 the Ministry of Intelligence and Iranian regime embassy in Baghdad – enjoying the full support of Nouri al-Maliki’s prime ministry office – stationed a number of Ministry of Intelligence agents under the pretext of the residents’ “family members” at Camp Ashraf’s entrance.
With support provided by the Iraqi army stationed outside of Ashraf to supposedly provide protection for the camp, the installed 9 loudspeakers on Ashraf’s main gate to broadcast aggressive messages against the residents. Very soon it became clear those who claimed to be family members of Ashraf residents were actually PMOI defectors or agents, all dispatched by the MOIS. Only a number of them were actually affiliated in some way to Ashraf. The MOIS was using these individuals to cover up its actual plans, agents and hirelings.
Over a period of two years the number of these loudspeakers reached 320, stationed all around Ashraf. Night and day they were blaring threats and insults against Ashraf residents to place the residents under torture and rob them of any chance of peace and comfort. This psychological torture continued for 677 days.

In the early 2010, the Iraqi Prime Minister Office in cooperation with the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad arranged the so-called “family visits” of Nejat Society to destabilize Ashraf. Number of MOIS agents assisted by the Iraqi army and under the guise of “family members”, set up camp at the main gate of Ashraf, fixing nine loudspeakers to the Gate’s metal frame to broadcast aggressive messages to the residents. Soon, it became obvious that those claimed to be families of Ashraf residents, were actually either PMOI defectors or agents, dispatched by MOIS. Only a small number of them had relatives in Ashraf. MOIS used them as a cover-up for its plot to disguise its true agents and paid-hands.
Over a period of two years, the loudspeakers multiplied to reach 320 units at the four wings of the camp’s perimeter fence, blaring threats and insults day and night at the residents, to torture the residents and destroy any chance of rest. The psychological torture continued for 677 days.

luadspeakers

Intimidation campaign to prepare grounds for bloody attacks

The Iranian regime in 2010 took the gloves off and under the pretext of “family visits” and stationing agents outside Camp Ashraf they launched an intidimication campaign against the residents and paved the grounds for future bloody attacks.
On April 8th, 2011, after over a year of psychological torture, Maliki’s forces at the Iranian regime’s behest launched a vicious attack leaving 36 residents killed and hundreds of others wounded and injured.
Prior to the September 1, 2013 massacre in Ashraf, MOIS and terrorist Quds Force agents, were transferred to Camp Ashraf under the guise of family members to carry out recon missions aimed at inflicting the maximum amount of casualties to the residents; whereas none of these individuals had a family member amongst those residents who had remained in Ashraf at the time. The September 2013 attack left 52 residents killed in a horrific manner. The latest threat project began in September 2015 to pave the path for the October 29th rocket attack. In this attack 80 enhanced rockets targeted Camp Liberty, resulting in 24 residents killed and dozens of others wounded and injured.

Intimidation campaign as preparation for deadly attacks
Consequently, the Iranian regime took a step further, unveiling its mask, using “family visits” to run an intimidation campaign against the residents, laying the ground for deadly attacks. Its evil ends became clear that it does not care for “reunion of families” but it seeks to annihilate the residents. On April 8, 2011, after more than one year of psychological torture, al-Maliki forces at the behest of the Iranian regime launched a violent attack, killing 36 residents and critically injuring hundreds more.
As such, the Iranian regime, through its proxies and the governmental committee in charge of Camp Ashraf and Liberty, conducted further deadly attacks against the residents. It gathers the disguised family members outside the camp, bombarding the residents with threats and intimidation as a prelude to yet another atrocity.
Prior to the September 1, 2013 massacre in Ashraf, agents of MOIS and Quds force, disguised as family members, were ferried to Camp Ashraf lurking around reconnoitering to inflict heavy casualties on the residents. The attack resulted in 52 residents slain in a brutal way. And the latest intimidation campaign started in September 2015 as a preparation of October 29, when 80 reinforced missiles struck the camp, leaving 24 residents dead and dozens injured.

assailants1
 Iraqi forces attacking Camp Ashraf on September 1, 2013

 

8 april Smallsize6
 Al-Maliki Forces running over Camp Ashraf residents on April 8, 2011

 

agents
Iranian intelligence agents under the guise of family members scouting around Camp Liberty for reconnaissance mission in September 2015 

 

 Missile Attack Oct29 6 Missile Attack Oct29 1
The casualities and damages left from the deadly missile attack on October 29, 2015, only weeks after the disguised family members appeared at Camp Liberty

As of yet, the persecution campaign is still going on and another atrocity is looming.

Following the transfer of Ashraf residents to Camp Liberty, from March 2015 onward the Iranian regime’s MOIS began sending its agents from Iran under the pretext of seeking family visits and stationing them outside of Liberty. All these measures were aimed at preparing the grounds for deadly attacks against the residents. The commuting of these agents from Iran and their stationing in Iraq were all provided under the cover of the Nejat Society. A few gatherings held by these individuals outside of Liberty where they chanted slogans such “We will level Liberty like we did Ashraf”, rendered the most intense rocket attack against the residents to this day on October 29th, 2015. This horrific attack took the lives of 24 residents.

Published in Nejat Society
Last modified on Monday, 14 March 2016 06:50

External Links

Two Misguided Reports

  • HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Report
    HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Report
    On 18 May 2005, the US based Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) issued a 28-page report (“the HRW Report”) concerning the People's Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (“PMOI / MEK”).  Entitled ‘No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps’, the HRW Report was essentially based on 12 hours of telephone interviews with 12…
  • Courting Disaster, A response to Rand report on People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran
    Courting Disaster, A response to Rand report on People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran
    The RAND National Defense Research Institute published in July 2009 the report The Mujahedin-e Khalq: A Policy Conundrum for the Multi-National Force-Iraq, Task Force 134 (Detainee Operations). The report focuses on the circumstances surrounding the detention of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) at Camp Ashraf and “whether MeK members were taken into custody…