By Staff Writer, Iran Probe
In today’s world, wars are not waged solely with weapons and bombs.
Propaganda and psychological warfare are modern tools of suppression and silent assassination. For years, Iran’s dictatorial regime has employed these tools alongside classic terrorism to silence its opponents, particularly the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK). To this end, it has enlisted mercenaries under titles such as “media activist,” “documentarian,” and “journalist” to tarnish the image of this organization internationally, including in Albania, which hosts thousands of members of this resistance in Ashraf 3 camp. One prominent figure in this project is an Albanian named Aldo Sulollari. This article exposes the true face of this Iranian regime intelligence operative and reveals his role in the regime’s demonization and psychological warfare campaign against the MEK.
Who is Aldo Sulollari?
Aldo Sulollari is an Albanian who has operated for years under the guise of a documentarian and media activist. But behind this mask lies another reality: organized ties with Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and a role in its most dangerous projects—namely, the demonization of the MEK, particularly the residents of Ashraf 3 in Albania. According to documented reports, Sulollari, with the support of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, has been carrying out a series of activities in Albania, including:
- Producing fabricated and biased documentaries against Ashraf 3 residents,
- Organizing small-scale shows and programs to propagate negative propaganda against the MEK,
- Republishing false and baseless accusations, previously used by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence, in the regime’s television channels and its front websites.
Trip to Tehran: Proof of His Mission
A turning point in exposing Aldo Sulollari’s true nature was his recent trip to Tehran in October 2025. Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence brought Sulollari to Iran in early October 2025 for further mission briefings. During this trip, he was accompanied by a low-ranking operative of the Ministry named Behzad Alishahi. Alishahi is widely regarded in the Iranian community as a despicable and rejected mercenary. He was arrested and imprisoned in the Netherlands for spying on Iranian regime opponents and their families and was later deported to Iran. Sulollari’s trip to Iran took place despite repeated warnings from the Albanian government about the Iranian regime’s destructive activities on its soil. In 2022, Albania severed diplomatic ties with the Iranian regime due to a cyberattack by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Nevertheless, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence continued its efforts to infiltrate public spaces by deploying unofficial agents like Sulollari.


Intelligence Operations Under the Guise of Documentary Filmmaking
Upon returning from Tehran, Sulollari, funded by the Ministry of Intelligence, began preparing materials against Ashraf 3. The topics he raises—such as “human rights violations,” “cultism,” and “lack of freedom for MEK members”—are exactly the same propaganda lines promoted by the Islamic Republic’s state media for years, repeatedly debunked as false by independent international organizations.
From Psychological Warfare to Terrorism: The Paris Experience
A historical example of the link between the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence propaganda and terrorism is the terrorist plot in Paris in June 2018. The regime, through its diplomat-terrorist Assadollah Assadi, planned to bomb a large gathering of the Iranian resistance. Tens of thousands of Iranian exiles and global figures attended the event, and only timely action by German, Belgian, and French police prevented a major human catastrophe. Assadi was sentenced to 20 years in prison in a Belgian court, and extensive evidence of his direct ties to the Ministry of Intelligence and its foreign operatives was uncovered.Albania’s security services have repeatedly warned about the dangers of the Iranian regime’s intelligence projects in recent years. In 2020, Albanian police identified and dismantled an intelligence network linked to the Ministry of Intelligence in Tirana.
The activities of the “Nejat Association” in Albania were also placed under scrutiny. However, the Iranian regime’s activities, carried out through proxy agents like Sulollari, persist—particularly those that appear to be media or cultural but are, in essence, part of the Ministry of Intelligence’s propaganda apparatus.









