About MOIS publication “Saddam’s Private Army”

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Cover of About MOIS publication “Saddam’s Private Army”
Cover of About MOIS publication “Saddam’s Private Army”

Comments on the mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry book
Entitled “Saddam’s Private Army”,
Psychological war and misinformation campaign against PMOI

November 2004

1. Introduction
One of the well-known methods employed by Iran’s Intelligence Ministry against the National Council of Resistance, its leadership and its members, especially the PMOI, is to publish numerous books, pamphlets, newsletters and newspapers. The Ministry’s biggest directorate, the General Department of Elteqat or Nefaq [hypocrisy], in charge of psychological warfare and dissemination of misleading information against the PMOI, directly supervises these publications. These books are usually published under the name of disaffected members of the PMOI who are later hired by the Intelligence Ministry.

Intelligence Minister Mullah Younessi on October 5, 2004 said about those who write these books, “Today, the Intelligence Ministry has several thousand experienced specialists on various topics.” (State-run television)

Sometimes, these individuals’ own remarks and writings against the PMOI are used, which of course are completely personal and marginal. Younessi said on August 31, 2004, “We have employed some MKO members against the MKO.”

The goal is to present misleading information to the reader and the tactic used is that of Goebbels, which is to fabricate big lies. Commenting on the advantages of spreading information in this way, Younessi described “the Intelligence method” as the most important tool to deal a setback to the PMOI, saying, “Only the Intelligence method produced results in countering the MKO; police and military approaches failed to do so.”

2. About the so-called writer of the book
The writer of the first part of the book is a British female agent of the mullahs’ Intelligence Ministry named Singleton. The first section of the book is obviously completely edited. However, the second part has been completely made up by those “experienced specialists” that Younessi had mentioned.

- Anne Singleton is the wife of another Intelligence Ministry agent, Massoud Khodabandeh, who resides in Britain and is a former PMOI member. He was hired by the Intelligence Ministry in the early 90s. As a routine practice, the Intelligence Ministry invites such individuals from their countries of residence to Singapore for briefing.

- Singleton was a sympathizer and a translator for the PMOI in Britain in the early 80s, and worked in the translation section of the Moslem Students Society - Supporters of the PMOI. After a while, when students realized that this woman is not morally decent, they dismissed her from the society. At that time, the clerical regime widely used moral issues in its anti-Mojahedin propaganda and the MSS was very sensitive about it.

- Singleton was subsequently hired by the Intelligence Ministry. Along with her husband, she now manages the Iran Interlink website, an MOIS site registered in Britain. The articles and material which appear on the website are completely the product of the Intelligence Ministry in Tehran.

- Singleton’s mother-in-law is a very wealthy Iranian woman whose two sons (Ibrahim and Massoud Khodabandeh) had become PMOI members. Both sons resided in Britain. The Intelligence Ministry pressured their family by freezing the mother’s assets.

- This filthy game with families is a common method of the Intelligence Ministry exposed time and again in the reports the UN special Representative on Iran, Professor Capithorne, submitted to the UN Human Rights Commission. In one instance, the Intelligence Ministry gave $100,000 to Mahmoud Malek Afzali (son of Marzieh, diva of Persian music and member of the NCR) to stand up at his mother’s concert in Earls Court, London, in June 1996 and shout out against his mother and the Resistance…

- The Intelligence Ministry’s scheme for the Khodabandeh family was to have the mother separate her sons from the Mojahedin or bid farewell to her possessions, which the Intelligence Ministry and Guards Corps were after.

- Ibrahim Khodabandeh (the elder brother) is the same person Syria extradited to Iran in June 2003.

- Using the cover of invitations by her mother-in-law, Singleton made frequent, secret trips to Tehran. Before setting up her website, she spent a whole month in Iran. (Emma Nicholson, member of the European Parliament, is another example of a Briton who is a trade partner of the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry.)

- In introducing the site, Iran Interlink website explicitly states, “Our goal is to widely reveal the Mojahedin’s real nature and act as a pressure group in this regard.” It adds, “This website has been founded for families and individuals whose friends and relatives are in an unsettled state or their lives are in danger as dissident members and personnel of the PMOI in Iraq…” One of its sources is “Dena in Germany”, i.e. the Intelligence Ministry's network in the Netherlands and Germany.

3. Why the book was written
Before the beginning of the war in March 2003, Tehran’s ruling regime launched a major campaign against the PMOI. The goal was to show that the PMOI and Iranian Resistance are in Iraq’s camp to pave the way for bombing PMOI/NLA bases. To this end, hundreds of news reports, pamphlets and books that were entirely written and prepared by the regime’s Intelligence Ministry were distributed across the world.

- The second section of the book, also written in the name of Anne Singleton, is totally made up of the material used for the regime’s propaganda campaign against the PMOI on the eve of the Coalition’s war on Iraq. The mullahs were well aware of the PMOI’s independence from Iraq and clearly knew that the PMOI would not engage in the 2003 war, just as it did not in the 1991 Kuwaiti Crisis. In this way, they intended to have the PMOI annihilated by the US before the Coalition Forces found out the truth. On August 6, 2003, former Guards Corps commander Mohsen Rezaii officially and publicly proclaimed the regime’s request to bomb PMOI/NLA bases.

- In the wake of the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement with the Coalition Forces and the voluntary consolidation of weapons, the clerical regime activated yet another front to compensate for this setback. The grounds for this front had been prepared since two years ago. So the regime managed to strike a deal with the Government of France and prepare a coup against the Iranian Resistance. In an unprecedented mobilization of forces, the French government organized a raid on Mrs. Rajavi's residence.

- In a major misinformation campaign, the Iranian regime's Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) managed to mislead the French intelligence services. They depicted the situation as if the Resistance's leadership had relocated its staff for military operations from Iraq to Auvers-sur-Oise along with a large number of weapons and persons to carry out the operations, intending to quickly turn Europe and especially France into a scene of armed confrontation and war with the Khomeini regime. To this end, the clerical regime bombarded the French services, officials and press with a plethora of books, pamphlets, publications and a mountain of false information.

- This fact was revealed by Mr. Michel Tubiana, chairman of the French Human Rights League and Vice President of the International Human Rights Federation, at a press conference in Paris on June 17, 2004. In the conference which was widely covered by the international media, Tubiana declared that the mullahs' Iran is a state-sponsor of terrorism and has distributed a mountain pile of various propaganda documents in France by its Iranian embassy.

- Today, in the wake of the announcement of the status of the People's Mojahedin, we see that the mullahs have launched an astonishing propaganda campaign against the PMOI in Iraq. As an example, please note the enclosed issues of a newspaper called, As-Shahed (the Witness). Page 3 of this publication is regularly written and laid out twice a week by the Ministry of Intelligence in Tehran and sent to Baghdad. An Iranian by the name of Youssefi pays one million dinars to the manager of this newspaper for each issue.

4. Psychological war of the clerical regime and its relevant agencies against the PMOI

The Organization of Islamic Culture and Communications --one of the mullahs' main agencies in charge of export of fundamentalism—emphasizes in one of its confidential documents on the significance of psychological war against the PMOI and writes, "Psychological war is not just a special technique, but part of any major strategy."

The clerical regime has invested enormously on this psychological war strategy or "the intelligence method" as the Minister of Intelligence Ali Younessi puts it. The relevant agencies involved in this anti-PMOI campaign are the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS), the Organization of Islamic Culture and Communications (ICCO), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Revolutionary Guards Ministry of Guidance, and the Organization for Islamic Propaganda.

The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), chaired by President Mohammad Khatami, is the highest authority that coordinates this campaign. The council’s secretary, Hojjatol-Islam Hassan Rohani, is a confidant of ex-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, while Ali Rabii, a former MOIS deputy and a Khatami protégé, heads the SNSC’s executive secretariat. Supreme Leader Khamenei approves the council’s important decisions.

The psychological war against the PMOI is a phenomenon mainly borne in the wake of the 1991 war of the Coalition against Iraq. In those years, Iran's ruling mullahs decided to take advantage of the new post-war conditions in the region to finish off the Mojahedin. The Intelligence Ministry was rapidly expanded and its area of activities extended. A new directorate by the name of Nefaq (or hypocrisy) took charge of this task with its elaborate organization.

Iran’s convoluted propaganda machine conducts complex disinformation operations that may seem incidental or spontaneous to an unsuspecting mind: identical reports appear simultaneously in second- or third-rate European or American tabloids on alleged involvement of the PMOI in the suppression of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites; a few “asylum-seekers” emerge from nowhere to claim that they were mistreated by the PMOI many years ago, etc.

In the absence of reliable information on how such propaganda is being disseminated by the clerical regime’s agencies, one may rightly assume that both sides to this conflict have vested interests in making these claims and counter-claims. The Resistance has responded to this propaganda blitz by relying on its extensive information-gathering network inside Iran to identify the agencies and officials involved in this psychological warfare and expose confidential documents and evidence relating to their activities. (The Iranian Resistance has published many books in this regard including among others "Documents on plans and conspiracies of the Islamic Culture and Communications Organization", "the Burnt Cards", "Schemes and conspiracies of the Intelligence Ministry against the PMOI", the Letter and Documents of Jamshid Tafrishi.)

5. The aftermath of September 11
In the aftermath of the tragic events on September 11, 2001, the clerical regime significantly stepped up its activities against the PMOI.

First, it demanded that the PMOI be expelled or at least restricted in European countries. MOIS agents Karim Haghi, Shams Ha'eri and Mehdi Khoshhal were instructed to pose as "former members of the PMOI" and pass a series of false information to the security services and press in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. For example, they falsely claimed that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are hidden in the PMOI camps. (Het Parol, the Netherlands; Ottawa Citizen, Canada; etc.)

Second, the clerical regime also increased the number of publications and articles that sought to demonize the PMOI. To this end, the MOIS assembled a group of writers and analysts in Kayhan, the largest government-owned publishing house in Iran, run by Hossein Shariatmadari. Shariatmadari, a brigadier-general of the Revolutionary Guards and a close confidant of Khamenei, is a veteran interrogator, torturer and propagandist who has been a key player in the clerical regime’s disinformation operations since the 1980s.

Third, the MOIS has also sent thousands of anti-Mojahedin letters from Iran to parliamentarians and officials in Europe. In an article in Sweden’s daily Göteborg Posten, Cecilia Malmström, a Swedish member of the European Parliament, unveiled one example of MOIS schemes to influence parliamentarians. (Göteborg Posten, January 19, 2002)

6. Clerical regime's tactics to advance its objectives
The examination of two cases will help understand the methods and tactics of the clerical regime:

- One of the individuals the MOIS claimed was a “senior PMOI member” was Jamshid Tafrishi who had spent only two months in Camp Ashraf before the Gulf war. The MOIS used Tafrishi to establish contact with activists and artists who were cooperating with the National Council of Resistance of Iran and encourage them to leave the ranks of the Resistance. Tafrishi also played a vital role in the regime’s anti-Mojahedin propaganda, including “the imprisonment, torture and harassment of former PMOI members,” “PMOI’s involvement in the suppression of Iraqi Kurds” and “acting as the go-between for the Iraqi regime to purchase chemical and nuclear materials.”

Contrary to Tehran’s propaganda, Tafrishi was not even a PMOI member, let alone a senior official. Ultimately, Tafrishi temporarily fell out with the MOIS over money problems. In the year 2000, he wrote a detailed letter to then-UN Human Rights Commission Special Representative on the Situation of Human Rights in Iran, Prof. Maurice Danby Capithorne and revealed his role and activities as an MOIS operative.

Tafrishi also submitted an affidavit to Court of Appeals in the District of Columbia. He wrote: "Until last year, I pretended that I was an opponent of the Iranian regime, while I was in fact advancing the assignments given by the Iranian regime's Intelligence Ministry….

"In these years, the Intelligence Ministry invited me to Singapore four times to meet the most senior officials of the Intelligence Ministry. Singapore is one of the locations the Intelligence Ministry uses to meet its agents… From 1995 until 1999, in addition to my travel and work expenses, I received a total of 72,000 dollars from the Intelligence Ministry as payment for my routine expenses.

"The Ministry had assigned me to carry out several tasks:
1. Accusing the PMOI of violating human rights as someone who had previously worked with the organization.
2. Recruitment of disaffected members and efforts aimed at luring non-PMOI members of the NCRI away from that coalition.
3. I was also assigned to the task of providing false information to European countries on the PMOI and the NCRI. I was also aware that other agents are engaged in similar activities in other countries.

"Alleging human rights abuses against the PMOI was one of the most serious projects the Ministry was pursuing outside Iran with me and a number of its other agents...

"In 1994, we were engaged in an extensive campaign to convince the Human Rights Watch that PMOI is engaged in human rights abuses and encouraged them to prepare a report in this regard. The information was also being sent to the United States Department of State who was preparing a report on the Mojahedin at the time...

"One of our tasks was to discredit the PMOI among members of parliaments and governments in Europe and the United States… As part of this plan, I was assigned to inform international organizations as well as foreign governments that PMOI was involved in suppressing the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. This plan was conducted under the supervision of Nasser Khajeh-Nouri, who was the regime’s agent in the United States. He organized an interview for me and a number of other agents with an Iranian radio station in Los Angeles to tell our story that PMOI suppressed the Kurdish people along the Iraqi forces. Khajeh-Nouri consequently prepared a report under my name on this issue and sent it to US intelligence and government agencies as well as the United Nations...

"In a similar move, Nasser Khajeh-Nouri once told me that he has received reliable information that PMOI is helping the Iraqi government to buy chemical weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. He asked me to expose the information and said we would then make it an international issue, by sending it to US government as well as European governments and international organizations. He said he would personally provide this information to US officials. To this end a public meeting was organized in June 1995, in Hamburg, Germany where I disclosed the information that had been given to me.

"In the course of these projects, I learned of Nasser Khajeh Nouri's close association with Saeed Imami and his role as the person in charge of implementing the (MOIS) schemes. I also learned of the relations of people like Alireza Nourizadeh, Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani, Karim Haghi, Kiumars Shokouhi, Nowrouz Ali Rezvani, Fereydoun Gilani, Nadereh Afshari, Hadi Shams Ha'eri, Saeed Shahsavandi and a number of other so-called opponents with the MOIS."

- Another Iranian refugee, Mahmoud Massoudi, wrote a letter in August 2002 to Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and revealed the active links between the MOIS and agents who operate as “ex-PMOI members” in such propaganda campaigns.

Massoudi wrote: "I have been in contact, over the past seven years, with a wide range of Iranian political groups and activists, including those who identify themselves as "former members of the Mojahedin" and I have had, without exaggeration, thousands of hours of dialogue and discussion with them as well as extensive correspondence.

"My experience of the past seven years made it clear that the ruling religious dictatorship makes political and intelligence-gathering use of certain groups and individuals, who have identified themselves as political refugees and opponents of the mullahs' regime, in order to ensure its own survival and destroy its real opponents…

"I was then informed that on April 5, 2002, a meeting was held at the home of Bahman Rastgou in Cologne, Germany, with the participation of Karim Haghi, Hadi Shams-Haeri, Mehdi Khoshhal, Mohammad-Reza Haghi, Bahman Rastgou, and several of the new arrivals, including Mohammad-Hossein Sobhani and Farhad Javaheri-Yar. In the meeting, Sobhani explained the plans and aims of his team in coming to Germany and in this connection, they agreed on a division of labor.

"Sobhani told those present that they came from Iran and more agents would follow them. Sobhani explained that he had mentioned the Intelligence Ministry's forthcoming plan (to bring individuals from Iran to Europe) to Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, Mehdi Khan-Baba Tehrani, Bahman Niroumand, Mansour Bayatzadeh, Farrokh Negahdar and several others so that they would assist the new arrivals from Iran and write them letters of recommendation.

"On August 5, 2002, Sobhani faxed a ten-page statement to me with the joint signatures of Javaheri-Yar and Edward Termadoyan. On this typed statement, there were corrections in handwriting. It was clear that neither Sobhani, nor Javaheri Yar or Termadoyan had the original text and that they had received the typed text from outside Germany and the original sender was in the Intelligence Ministry in Tehran. They claimed, however, that they are 'opponents of the Mojahedin' and after being arrested by the Mojahedin, they had been handed over to Iraq and by Iraq to Iran. They claimed that they had mysteriously managed to escape the Ministry of Intelligence and come to Europe…"

7. Testimonies of official authorities
A. Germany
- The German security agency, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Bfv, wrote in its 1997 annual report, “One of the main tasks of the Iranian secret service is to keep an eye on Iranians living in Germany who oppose the regime. Its top priority is to keep surveillance on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran and their political arm, the National Council of Resistance.”

- In its 1999 annual report, Bfv affirmed:
The principal objective of the Iranian secret service is still to fight the Iranian oppositionists. … the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and its political wing, the NCRI, are still at the top of the Intelligence Ministry’s activities. To grapple against the activities of the opposition in exile, Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has established various cultural associations. These are cover agencies that work for MOIS and the Iranian regime. Other than this, MOIS tries to publish various publications, some in the name of those who introduce themselves as ex-members of the PMOI, in order to persuade the reader to retract from the organization.

- The Bfv report in June 2002 stated:
“The exiled opposition in Germany is still in the core of the surveillance activity of Iran’s secret service, MOIS… Like previous years Iran’s secret service tries to enlist active or ex-members of opposition groups. This, in many instances, is taking place with intimidating them or their families who are living in Iran.”

B. The Netherlands
Dutch Interior Security Service (BVD) in its 1999 annual report wrote: “Mojahedin-e Khalgh (PMOI), Iran’s most important opposition organization has representative in The Netherlands… An important job of Iran’s secret service organizations is tracing and enlisting the opposition members abroad, especially past and present members of MEK (PMOI)… One method used is printing and distribution of literature harming a particular opposition organization...”

- BVD wrote in its year 2000 report: “…Iranian statesmen act harshly against the opposition groups. Most of their attention is directed towards ex-supporters of PMOI… Iran’s secret service administers its tasks not only under cover of usual diplomatic means but also increasingly from inside of Iran.”

- The BVD noted in its 2001 report: “Supporters of the most important group i.e. Mojahedin-e Khalgh, are more then anyone else, and particularly, subject of attention of Iran’s secret service. Also, the agents of MOIS are instructed to distribute negative information about PMOI and its members. In this way, they attempt to weaken the organization and, in order to end their social and political movements, strive to portray a satanic view of the Mojahedin in host countries.”

8. Fabricating news against the PMOI
An ICCO internal memorandum in September 1996 stated, “Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller said that there are reports of Iranian forces entering Iraqi Kurdistan. An Iraqi Kurdish source told CNN, ‘reports about the presence of Iranian forces in Iraq are not an allegation.’ The reports on the presence of Iranian forces in Iraqi territory were deemed dangerous and steps were taken to divert the focus of these reports from Iran. A plan was devised to use the available information on the presence of Iranian forces in Iraqi Kurdistan and gradually introduce these forces as those of the Mojahedin. As such, it would appear that we have acknowledged the reports on the presence of forces of Iranian origin in Iraqi Kurdistan, but at the same time, we can attribute the negative aspect of this intervention to the Mojahedin and deal a blow to them.”

The clerical regime thus fabricated a piece of news and put it at the disposal of foreign media where it had influence. Simultaneously, MOIS operatives abroad such as Nasser Khajeh Nouri in Washington, DC, and Manouk Khoda Bakhshian in Los Angeles relayed these reports to Farsi-language news outlets to give it more coverage.

9. So-called cultural associations
Forming cultural associations to disseminate false propaganda against the Iranian Resistance is another MOIS tactic. These associations are purported not to be in contact with the regime and in fact even criticize it so that these associations could be used as a front to collect intelligence and disseminate negative propaganda against the PMOI. One such association is Nahavand Cultural Association, which uses a Canadian address. Others are Payvand Association in the Netherlands and Dena organization in Germany. Mahdis and Iran-Interlink websites are among other outlets set up by the MOIS to disseminate propaganda against the PMOI. All these associations and websites focus their propaganda against the PMOI while using the cover of independent or even anti-regime entities.

10. Murder of Christian priests
In a short period between 1993 and 1994, three prominent Christian leaders -- Bishop Haik Hovespian-Mehr, Pastor Mehdi Dibaj and Bishop Tataos Michaelian-- disappeared one after another and were mysteriously murdered. In those days the Ministry of Intelligence and regime's officials did not spare any opportunity to accuse the PMOI of having committed this murder. They even stage-managed a press conference where three women who claimed to be members of the PMOI confessed that the PMOI had committed the murders. The ridiculous stage-managing did not deceive anyone, however.

- Foreign Office Minister Jeremy Hanley of Britain wrote in a letter on December 4, 1995, “Despite the fact that the trial was held in public, it is not possible to say that justice was done. We are concerned that certain aspects of the procedure did not conform to generally accepted international standards.”

- In his February 9, 1996 report, Abdelfattah Amor, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Religious Tolerance, wrote, “The Iranian government had apparently decided to execute those Protestant leaders in order not only to bring the Mojahedin organization into disrepute abroad by declaring it responsible for those crimes, but also, at the domestic level, partly to decapitate the Protestant community and force it to discontinue the conversion of Muslims.”

- In the course of the escalation of factional feuding some years later, then-Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri wrote in now-defunct Khordad daily : "How is it that when those Christian clergymen were murdered and then their mutilated bodies were placed in a refrigerator, the killers' identities were not made public?" (Khordad daily, October 30, 1999)

- The Arya daily wrote: “Murdering the clergymen and blaming it on the Mojahedin enabled the perpetrators to liquidate the Christian priests and further discredit the Mojahedin.” (Arya daily, December 4, 1999)

11. Bombing of the Holy Shrine of Imam Reza
A powerful bomb rocked the holy shrine of Imam Reza, the revered eighth Shiite Imam, in the northeastern city of Mashad on June 20, 1994. Scores of worshipers in the packed shrine were reportedly killed or wounded. Immediately after the news of the bombing broke out, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said on the state radio: "The [Mojahedin], blind-hearted and treacherous as they are, have shown that they have no respect whatsoever for the holy family of the Prophet."

Then-Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati summoned all foreign ambassadors to his Ministry and demanded that their governments condemn the Mojahedin and the Iranian Resistance.

Ultimately, during the revelations on the 1998 chain murders, the state-controlled media acknowledged that the bombing of Imam Reza’s shrine, similar to the murder of the Christian priests, had been planned and carried out by the MOIS to tarnish the image of the Mojahedin.

In a report on this matter, the daily Khordad wrote: “Is it not possible that those who have masterminded the bombing of the holy Shrine of Imam Reza a few years ago in order to defuse international pressures over the murder of Christian clergymen were attempting to link these incidents to undermine the notion that the murder of the Christian priests may have been an internal affair and to prevent any government official from being held responsible for the killings?” (Khordad, 20 November 1999)

12. A new example
A new directive from the Intelligence Ministry to its agents abroad suggests that there is a campaign against the PMOI and US Forces on the issue of the Exit Facility (TIF). Our sources in Iran are trying to obtain the full text of this directive.

Based on this directive, a rumor has to be widely spread that the TIF --jointly run by the US Forces and the PMOI-- where the individuals are under a great deal of pressure, is the site of imprisonment and torture of “former members of the Mojahedin." US commanders in agreement with the PMOI and Mr. Rajavi, send dissident individuals there and put them under pressure. These people are punished if they defy orders issued by Rajavi and US commanders.

US Forces condition any family meeting with relatives in Camp Ashraf on permission from PMOI commanders inside the camp…

The MOIS directive mentions that some Red Cross representatives and UNHCR officials have privately told mullahs’ agents that should US stop protecting the PMOI, the UNHCR can send every one who has refugee status with other countries to his/her respective country as quickly as possible…

The directive says that efforts must be made to meet with certain people in TIF. In addition, Iran Interlink must announce that since Ashraf residents know nothing about the news in Iran and the world, it is ready to donate 3,800 transistor radios to the people in the camp via the Red Cross, and the US Forces are required to distribute the radios in accordance with the Geneva Convention.

The measure aims to establish communication between the Iranian regime and its agents via the donated radio transmitters that are tuned to Radio Nejat. This also facilitates access to Radio Nejat, which is run by the Intelligence Ministry and airs particularly dirty programs for the residents of Ashraf.

Another notable point in the directive is making use of Bani Sadr, Khomeini's first president, in this project, who is supposed to write letters to various international bodies and human rights organizations to increase pressure on the US Forces and the PMOI….

The Mojahedin saved Bani Sadr’s life. He had taken refuge in Mr. Rajavi’s residence. Mr. Rajavi took Bani Sadr to Paris with him on July 29, 1981 aboard the plane piloted by Colonel Mo’ezi (who previously was the Shah's pilot). But when victory was not quickly achieved, Bani Sadr began secret correspondence with Khomeini. The NCR dismissed him and published his secret letter at the time. Bani Sadr’s role in spreading false information against the PMOI is exactly like Chalabi’s role in Iraq.

For example, when in 1987 the mullahs set fire to the House of God in Mecca and set off explosions in Saudi Arabia, Bani Sadr said the Mojahedin committed this crime with Saddam’s help. He also claimed in Europe that the Mojahedin killed Iraqi Shiites and Kurds at Saddam’s service.

The regime works through such individuals to level its allegations against the Mojahedin including the bombing of Imam Reza’s shrine and the PMOI's lack of popular support inside Iran. The first person who said the NCR no longer has any meaning and it is the same as PMOI, was Bani Sadr after he was dismissed from the NCR. In Paris, Bani Sadr is in constant contact with intelligence ministry agents, including Singleton and her husband Massoud Khodabandeh.


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